Parental rights - federal, 50 states and DC, and abroad
Parental rights: what the law actually says
Parents have a constitutionally protected interest in raising their own children, and a fit parent's decision is supposed to carry weight. This page sets out where that comes from, how far it reaches, and where it stops - using the primary sources, with the contrary authority left in. General information, not legal advice.
Educational reference, not legal advice. Nothing here creates an attorney-client relationship. Family law is state-specific and it changes: a statute or case cited here may have been amended, repealed or overruled since the review date shown. Verify against the primary source before relying on anything on this page, and talk to a lawyer licensed in your state about your own situation.
Federal constitutional law
The federal layer is the floor every state builds on. A line of U.S. Supreme Court cases running from 1923 to 2000 establishes that parents have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the care, custody and upbringing of their children, and that a fit parent's own decision is entitled to weight. The same line marks the limits: the right is not absolute, the presumption behind it is rebuttable, and the Court has never settled what standard of review applies.
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)
HoldingFourteenth Amendment liberty includes the right to marry, establish a home and bring up children; a state law barring the teaching of any modern foreign language to children who had not passed the eighth grade (here, German) was unconstitutional.
Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience
Official U.S. Reports PDF, Library of Congress - checked 2026-10-16
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925)
HoldingA state may not compel children to attend public school only; parents have the liberty to direct their children's education and upbringing.
The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.
Official U.S. Reports PDF, Library of Congress - checked 2026-10-16
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)
HoldingParental authority over a child's custody, care and nurture is primary, but it is not absolute: the state may regulate in the public interest (here, child labor laws applied despite a religious claim).
It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.
Official U.S. Reports PDF, Library of Congress - checked 2026-10-16
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (the limit)
Contrary authority - bindingContrary authority, same page: the Court expressly holds parental rights are not beyond limitation. Often omitted when Prince is quoted for parental rights.
But the family itself is not beyond regulation in the public interest, as against a claim of religious liberty. ... And neither rights of religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitation.
Official U.S. Reports PDF, Library of Congress - checked 2026-10-16
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring))
HoldingAn unwed father could not be presumed unfit without a hearing; his interest in his children is constitutionally protected.
It is plain that the interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children "come[s] to this Court with a momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from shifting economic arrangements."
Official U.S. Reports PDF, Library of Congress - checked 2026-10-16
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972)
HoldingAmish parents could not be compelled to send children to school past eighth grade; parental primacy in upbringing combined with free exercise overcame the compulsory-attendance law.
This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition.
Official U.S. Reports PDF, Library of Congress - checked 2026-10-16
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978)
HoldingAn unwed father who had never had custody or taken day-to-day responsibility could have his rights terminated on a best-interest standard. Limits how far Stanley reaches.
he has never exercised actual or legal custody over his child, and thus has never shouldered any significant responsibility with respect to the daily supervision, education, protection, or care of the child
Official U.S. Reports PDF, Library of Congress - checked 2026-10-16
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979)
HoldingParents may commit a child for mental health treatment subject to a neutral factfinder; the law presumes parents act in their child's best interests. Source of the language Troxel later quotes.
More important, historically it has recognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children.
Official U.S. Reports PDF, Library of Congress - checked 2026-10-16
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (the presumption is rebuttable)
Contrary authority - bindingContrary authority, the very next sentence: the parental presumption is a starting point, not a conclusion.
As with so many other legal presumptions, experience and reality may rebut what the law accepts as a starting point
Official U.S. Reports PDF, Library of Congress - checked 2026-10-16
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48, 753 (1982)
HoldingBefore a state may terminate parental rights it must prove its case by at least clear and convincing evidence; the parental liberty interest survives even imperfect parenting and temporary loss of custody.
Before a State may sever completely and irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural child, due process requires that the State support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence. ... The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State.
Official U.S. Reports PDF, Library of Congress - checked 2026-10-16
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68-69 (2000) (plurality opinion)
HoldingA breathtakingly broad grandparent-visitation statute was unconstitutional as applied because it gave a fit mother's own decision no weight. The controlling principle, stated in Justice O'Connor's four-Justice plurality opinion: fit parents are presumed to act in their children's best interests.
That aspect of the case is important, for there is a presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of their children. ... Accordingly, so long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i. e., is fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family to further question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent's children.
Official U.S. Reports PDF, Library of Congress - checked 2026-10-16
The federal statutes that shape state intervention
- 42 U.S.C. sec. 667(a), (b)(2)
As a condition of Title IV-D funding, every state must have child-support guidelines, review them at least once every four years, and treat the guideline amount as a rebuttable presumption, which a written or on-the-record finding, under criteria the State sets, that the guideline amount would be unjust or inappropriate is sufficient to rebut. This is why a below-guideline deal between parents is not simply a private contract.
There shall be a rebuttable presumption, in any judicial or administrative proceeding for the award of child support, that the amount of the award which would result from the application of such guidelines is the correct amount of child support to be awarded. A written finding or specific finding on the record that the application of the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate in a particular case, as determined under criteria established by the State, shall be sufficient to rebut the presumption
Cornell Legal Information Institute U.S. Code text - checked 2026-10-16
- 42 U.S.C. sec. 671(a)(15)(A)-(B)
Title IV-E conditions federal foster-care money on the state making reasonable efforts to prevent removal and to reunify families, while making the child's health and safety paramount. The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 added the health-and-safety language and the exceptions where reasonable efforts are not required.
in determining reasonable efforts to be made with respect to a child ... the child's health and safety shall be the paramount concern; (B) except as provided in subparagraph (D), reasonable efforts shall be made to preserve and reunify families-- (i) prior to the placement of a child in foster care, to prevent or eliminate the need for removing the child from the child's home
Cornell Legal Information Institute U.S. Code text - checked 2026-10-16
The standard-of-review question, honestly
Troxel is widely described as applying strict scrutiny. It did not. The controlling opinion was a plurality that struck the statute as applied without naming any tier of review, which is why lower courts still divide on the question. The honest statement is that the parental right is fundamental and that the standard of review for infringing it is unsettled.
- The controlling opinion named no standard, and one Justice would have applied strict scrutiny
Concurrence of one Justice. Binds nobody but it is direct evidence from inside the case about what the plurality did not say.
The opinions of the plurality, JUSTICE KENNEDY, and JUSTICE SOUTER recognize such a right, but curiously none of them articulates the appropriate standard of review. I would apply strict scrutiny to infringements of fundamental rights.
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 80 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment)
- The right should not be judicially enforced at all
Dissent. Binds nobody, and is the strongest contrary position on the books.
Judicial vindication of "parental rights" under a Constitution that does not even mention them requires (as JUSTICE KENNEDY'S opinion rightly points out) not only a judicially crafted definition of parents, but also ...
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 92 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
State by state
- Harm or detriment required 6
- Fit-parent presumption, rebuttable 4
- Best interest alone 0
- No authority found 0
- Not yet reviewed 41
Coverage: 10 of 51 jurisdictions reviewed for this question. A jurisdiction shown as "Not yet reviewed" makes no claim either way - it means nobody has read its law for this question yet.
United States
Hover or tap a state
Harm or detriment required (6)
Fit-parent presumption, rebuttable (4)
Best interest alone (0)
None.
No authority found (0)
None.
Not yet reviewed (41)
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, Wyoming
When one parent decides alone, who pays?
This is one of the most common fights in a co-parenting case: one parent signs the child up for daycare, an activity, a private school or an elective treatment, and then sends the other parent a bill. Three separate questions decide whether that bill is owed, and they are often run together.
- Was it a decision that parent was allowed to make alone? Under joint legal custody the major decisions belong to both parents. Which decisions count as "major" is defined by state law, and the lists are narrower than people expect - they typically name things like choice of school and non-emergency health care. Day-to-day choices during a parent's own time are usually that parent's to make.
- Is the cost the kind the guideline lets anyone share? Child support guidelines generally allow an add-on only for particular categories, and many states limit the child care add-on to care that is actually needed for work or education, and only to a reasonable amount. A cost outside the category is not shareable just because it was spent on the child.
- Is there an order assigning it? A share of an add-on cost is normally something a court assigns. Where that is so, the duty comes from the order, not from one parent's receipt - and spending money first does not create an obligation that no order imposed.
A related point comes up when the other parent offered to care for the child themselves during their own time and the paid service was not needed. A right of first refusal requires offering the time to the other parent before hiring care. In Illinois it is a term the court may include in an order (750 ILCS 5/602.3), not a default rule, and Virginia directs the court to weigh the other parent's willingness and availability to provide care personally when it decides whether child-care costs are necessary or excessive (Va. Code sec. 20-108.2(F)). Whether it applies in a given case depends on the statute and the order, not on fairness in the abstract; this page does not claim a rule beyond those texts.
The map above, under the question about one parent deciding alone, records what each reviewed jurisdiction actually does. The categories deliberately separate "not liable without agreement or an order" from "liable only if reasonable and necessary" from "may be ordered to share on best-interest grounds", because those lead to different outcomes on the same facts. The last of them is left in place for jurisdictions that turn out to allow a best-interest allocation; no reviewed jurisdiction currently sits in it.
Other countries
The United States is an outlier in two ways. It is one of the very few countries that signed the Convention on the Rights of the Child and never ratified it, so the Convention binds nothing in American courts. And American practice leans towards resolving parenting by court order, where some other systems actively prefer that parents who agree be left alone. The instruments below are quoted from their official texts; the country table is only as wide as what has actually been verified.
International instruments
- UN Convention on the Rights of the Child - Article 3(1) best interests
In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.
United States status: Signed 1995, never ratified. It is not binding law in the United States, and no American court is obliged to apply it. - official text
- UN Convention on the Rights of the Child - Article 5 parental direction and guidance
States Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents or, where applicable, the members of the extended family or community as provided for by local custom, legal guardians or other persons legally responsible for the child, to provide, in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child, appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise by the child of the rights recognized in the present Convention.
United States status: Signed 1995, never ratified. - official text
- UN Convention on the Rights of the Child - Article 9(1) separation from parents
States Parties shall ensure that a child shall not be separated from his or her parents against their will, except when competent authorities subject to judicial review determine, in accordance with applicable law and procedures, that such separation is necessary for the best interests of the child.
United States status: Signed 1995, never ratified. - official text
- UN Convention on the Rights of the Child - Article 18(1) both parents, primary responsibility
States Parties shall use their best efforts to ensure recognition of the principle that both parents have common responsibilities for the upbringing and development of the child. Parents or, as the case may be, legal guardians, have the primary responsibility for the upbringing and development of the child. The best interests of the child will be their basic concern.
United States status: Signed 1995, never ratified. - official text
- European Convention on Human Rights - Article 8 private and family life
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
United States status: Does not apply to the United States. It binds the 46 member states of the Council of Europe. - official text
| Country | Parental autonomy | Intervention threshold | Agreement without a court | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| England and Wales | The child's welfare is the court's paramount consideration a stronger formulation than the Convention's 'a primary consideration'. Parental involvement is presumed, but involvement expressly does not mean any particular division of the child's time. | Court orders about upbringing are governed by the welfare principle and the statutory welfare checklist. | Strongly preferred. The no-order principle directs that a court shall not make an order unless doing so would be better for the child than making no order at all, so parents who agree are generally left without one. | Official |
Every source on this page
65 sources, each checked against the primary text. Concurrences, dissents and dicta are marked, because they bind nobody. "Contrary authority" is a separate label: it marks a source that cuts against the parental-rights reading, and several of those are holdings of the Court that bind everyone.
| Citation | Jurisdiction | Year | Kind | What it says | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) | United States | 1923 | Holding | Fourteenth Amendment liberty includes the right to marry, establish a home and bring up children; a state law barring the teaching of any modern foreign language to children who had not passed the eighth grade (here, German) was unconstitutional. | Source |
| Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) | United States | 1925 | Holding | A state may not compel children to attend public school only; parents have the liberty to direct their children's education and upbringing. | Source |
| Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) | United States | 1944 | Holding | Parental authority over a child's custody, care and nurture is primary, but it is not absolute: the state may regulate in the public interest (here, child labor laws applied despite a religious claim). | Source |
| Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (the limit) | United States | 1944 | Contrary authority - binding | Contrary authority, same page: the Court expressly holds parental rights are not beyond limitation. Often omitted when Prince is quoted for parental rights. | Source |
| Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)) | United States | 1972 | Holding | An unwed father could not be presumed unfit without a hearing; his interest in his children is constitutionally protected. | Source |
| Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) | United States | 1972 | Holding | Amish parents could not be compelled to send children to school past eighth grade; parental primacy in upbringing combined with free exercise overcame the compulsory-attendance law. | Source |
| Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978) | United States | 1978 | Holding | An unwed father who had never had custody or taken day-to-day responsibility could have his rights terminated on a best-interest standard. Limits how far Stanley reaches. | Source |
| Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) | United States | 1979 | Holding | Parents may commit a child for mental health treatment subject to a neutral factfinder; the law presumes parents act in their child's best interests. Source of the language Troxel later quotes. | Source |
| Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (the presumption is rebuttable) | United States | 1979 | Contrary authority - binding | Contrary authority, the very next sentence: the parental presumption is a starting point, not a conclusion. | Source |
| Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48, 753 (1982) | United States | 1982 | Holding | Before a state may terminate parental rights it must prove its case by at least clear and convincing evidence; the parental liberty interest survives even imperfect parenting and temporary loss of custody. | Source |
| Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68-69 (2000) (plurality opinion) | United States | 2000 | Holding | A breathtakingly broad grandparent-visitation statute was unconstitutional as applied because it gave a fit mother's own decision no weight. The controlling principle, stated in Justice O'Connor's four-Justice plurality opinion: fit parents are presumed to act in their children's best interests. | Source |
| Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 80 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) | United States | 2000 | Concurrence - binds nobody | A concurrence in the judgment, binding on nobody, and the best evidence that Troxel fixed no tier of scrutiny: Justice Thomas notes that none of the opinions recognising the right says what standard of review applies, and says he would apply strict scrutiny. | Source |
| Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 92 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) | United States | 2000 | Dissent - binds nobody | A dissent, binding on nobody, and the strongest contrary voice: Justice Scalia would not extend judicially enforceable parental rights, noting the Constitution does not mention them. | Source |
| 42 U.S.C. sec. 667(a), (b)(2) | United States | 1984 | Statute | As a condition of Title IV-D funding, every state must have child-support guidelines, review them at least once every four years, and treat the guideline amount as a rebuttable presumption, which a written or on-the-record finding, under criteria the State sets, that the guideline amount would be unjust or inappropriate is sufficient to rebut. This is why a below-guideline deal between parents is not simply a private contract. | Source |
| 42 U.S.C. sec. 671(a)(15)(A)-(B) | United States | 1997 | Statute | Title IV-E conditions federal foster-care money on the state making reasonable efforts to prevent removal and to reunify families, while making the child's health and safety paramount. The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 added the health-and-safety language and the exceptions where reasonable efforts are not required. | Source |
| Wis. Stat. sec. 767.001(1s) | Wisconsin | 2025 | Statute | Under joint legal custody neither parent's legal custody rights are superior, except for decisions the court or the parties have specifically assigned. Neither parent can outrank the other on a major decision. | Source |
| Wis. Stat. sec. 767.001(2m) | Wisconsin | 2025 | Statute | Defines the major decisions that joint legal custody makes joint. Choice of school and authorization for nonemergency health care are named; choice of a child care provider and extracurricular activities are not named, though the list is expressly not exhaustive. | Source |
| Wis. Stat. sec. 767.001(5) | Wisconsin | 2025 | Statute | During their own placement time a parent makes the routine daily decisions about the child's care, so long as those stay consistent with the major decisions of whoever holds legal custody. | Source |
| Wis. Admin. Code DCF sec. 150.02(29) | Wisconsin | 2024 | Regulation | Wisconsin's variable costs, the category child care falls into, are limited to reasonable costs. Wisconsin does not restrict the child care component to work-related or education-related care the way many state guidelines do, but the reasonableness limit applies to every variable cost. | Source |
| Wis. Admin. Code DCF sec. 150.035(1)(b)6. | Wisconsin | 2024 | Regulation | In shared placement the court assigns responsibility for variable costs in proportion to placement and on the basis of a detailed list the parties provide. Responsibility is assigned by the court; it does not arise automatically because one parent spent money. | Source |
| Ondrasek v. Tenneson, 158 Wis. 2d 690, 692, 462 N.W.2d 915 (Ct. App. 1990) | Wisconsin | 1990 | Holding | A stipulation that waives child support or sets an unmodifiable ceiling on it is against public policy, and a court is not bound by it; the child's best interests transcend an agreement or stipulation of the parties (158 Wis. 2d at 695). | Source |
| Wis. Stat. sec. 767.34(1), (2)(a) | Wisconsin | 2025 | Statute | Wisconsin parties in an annulment, divorce or legal separation may stipulate about custody and placement as well as support, but the statute makes every such stipulation subject to the approval of the court, and bars approval of a support stipulation unless the support is determined consistently with s. 767.511 (the guideline, or a deviation with the required findings) or s. 767.89. | Source |
| Rick v. Opichka, 2010 WI App 23, 323 Wis. 2d 510, 522-24, 780 N.W.2d 159 | Wisconsin | 2010 | Holding | Construing the placement statute: a person with physical placement but not legal custody may make routine daily decisions about the child's care and nothing greater, and may not make decisions inconsistent with the legal custodian's major decisions. | Source |
| Michels v. Lyons (In re Visitation of A.A.L.), 2019 WI 57, para. 1, 387 Wis. 2d 1, 927 N.W.2d 486 | Wisconsin | 2019 | Holding | The Wisconsin Supreme Court took the case to settle what a grandparent must prove to overcome the presumption that a fit parent's visitation decision is in the child's best interest the state's direct application of the Troxel presumption. Opinion by Dallet, J.; appeal no. 2017AP1142. | Source |
| Michels v. Lyons, 2019 WI 57, para. 2, 387 Wis. 2d 1, 927 N.W.2d 486 | Wisconsin | 2019 | Holding | The Wisconsin Supreme Court holds that a fit parent's interest in the care and upbringing of the child is a fundamental liberty interest, so the grandparent visitation statute must withstand strict scrutiny. Wisconsin's supreme court has answered the standard-of-review question Troxel left open. | Source |
| Michels v. Lyons, 2019 WI 57, para. 44 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., concurring) | Wisconsin | 2019 | Concurrence - binds nobody | A concurrence, which binds nobody, agreeing with the majority that sec. 767.43(3) infringes the parental liberty interest and must withstand strict scrutiny. The majority's own statement of that holding is recorded separately (2019 WI 57, para. 2). | Source |
| Fla. Stat. sec. 61.30(7) | Florida | 2026 | Statute | Florida adds child care to the support obligation only when it is incurred for employment, job search or education, and caps it at the level required for quality licensed care. A more expensive provider one parent chose alone is not automatically shareable. | Source |
| Va. Code sec. 20-108.2(F) | Virginia | 2026 | Statute | Virginia limits the child-care add-on to costs due to the custodial parent's employment, caps it at quality licensed care, lets the other parent demand documentation, and directly on the point of a parent who offered to care for the child themselves directs the court to weigh that offer when deciding whether the cost was necessary at all. | Source |
| Wash. Rev. Code sec. 26.19.080(3) | Washington | 2026 | Statute | Washington treats day care as a court-ordered expense shared in proportion to income, and gives an express claw-back: a parent who pays ordered day care that is never actually incurred can recover the overpayment once it reaches 20 percent of the annual amount. | Source |
| Minn. Stat. sec. 518A.40 subd. 1 | Minnesota | 2026 | Statute | Minnesota divides only work-related or education-related child care, and makes the parents' own agreement on the point effective only if the court approves it. 2026 Minn. Laws ch. 88, art. 1, sec. 213 amended subd. 1 only to rename the agency; the quoted rule is unchanged. | Source |
| 750 ILCS 5/602.3(a)-(b) | Illinois | 2026 | Statute | Illinois codifies a right of first refusal to provide child care during the other parent's time, but it is permissive, not automatic: the court MAY consider whether to award it. Advocacy material often describes this as a right Illinois parents simply have; on the statute's face it is a term a court may include. | Source |
| 750 ILCS 5/505(a)(3.6), (3.7) | Illinois | 2026 | Statute | Illinois makes both child care and school/extracurricular costs discretionary court-ordered add-ons limited to what is reasonable, and defines child care expenses by purpose: actual expenses reasonably necessary for employment, training or a job search. A parent who enrols the child alone is not creating a shared debt; a court decides whether and how much to allocate. | Source |
| Ohio Rev. Code sec. 3119.05(P)(1) | Ohio | 2026 | Statute | Ohio shares child care as part of the support calculation but limits what counts: the cost must be necessary to allow a parent to work or for employment training, must be verifiable by credible evidence, and excludes any reimbursed or subsidised amount including unclaimed tax credits. | Source |
| Pa.R.Civ.P. 1910.16-6(a)(1) | Pennsylvania | 2026 | Regulation | Pennsylvania allocates only reasonable child care expenses, and only where they are necessary to maintain employment or appropriate education in pursuit of income. The allocation is made by the trier of fact. | Source |
| Md. Code, Fam. Law sec. 12-204(g) | Maryland | 2026 | Statute | Maryland adds only actual child care expenses incurred because of a parent's employment or job search, and caps them: where actual family experience does not control, the figure is the level required to provide quality care from a licensed source, or the actual cost if the parent chose something cheaper. | Source |
| Mo. Rev. Stat. sec. 452.340.1(6) | Missouri | 2026 | Statute | Among the factors for a support order, Missouri counts only the reasonable work-related child care expenses of each parent both limiters, purpose and reasonableness, in a single clause. | Source |
| Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 3(1) (1989) | International | 1989 | Treaty or convention | The best-interests principle, in its actual wording: best interests are A primary consideration, not the paramount one. The distinction is routinely lost in argument, and it matters because 'a primary consideration' leaves room for competing interests such as a parent's own rights. | Source |
| Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 5 (1989) | International | 1989 | Treaty or convention | States must respect parental responsibilities, rights and duties to give direction and guidance to the child. This is the Convention's parental-autonomy provision, and it is the answer to the claim that the CRC displaces parents in favour of the state. | Source |
| Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 9(1) (1989) | International | 1989 | Treaty or convention | A child may not be separated from their parents against their will unless competent authorities subject to judicial review determine it is necessary for the child's best interests the Convention's analogue to the due-process limits on removal. | Source |
| Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 18(1) (1989) | International | 1989 | Treaty or convention | Both parents have common responsibilities for upbringing, and parents not the state have the primary responsibility. | Source |
| European Convention on Human Rights, art. 8 | Council of Europe | 1950 | Treaty or convention | The right to respect for family life, and the structured test for when a state may interfere with it: in accordance with the law, and necessary in a democratic society for one of the listed aims. European family-law cases are argued on this proportionality structure rather than on tiers of scrutiny. | Source |
| Children Act 1989 (England and Wales), s. 1(1), (2A)-(2B), (5) | United Kingdom | 1989 | Statute | England and Wales make the child's welfare paramount, a stronger formulation than the Convention's 'a primary consideration'. In contested section 8 and parental-responsibility applications (s. 1(4)(a), (7)) the court presumes that each parent's involvement furthers the child's welfare, unless that parent's involvement would put the child at risk (s. 1(6)), and 'involvement' expressly does NOT mean any particular division of the child's time; subsections (2A)-(2B) were added in 2014. The no-order principle in s. 1(5) is the sharpest contrast with US practice: in any case where the court is considering an order, it may not make one unless doing so would be better for the child than making no order at all. | Source |
| ORS 109.119(2)(a), (3) | Oregon | 2026 | Statute | Oregon writes the fit-parent presumption into its third-party statute: in any custody, guardianship or visitation proceeding under ORS 109.119 the legal parent is presumed to act in the child's best interest. A person with a child-parent relationship must rebut it by a preponderance of the evidence; a person with an ongoing personal relationship, by clear and convincing evidence. | Source |
| Tex. Fam. Code sec. 153.433(a)(2) | Texas | 2025 | Statute | A Texas grandparent seeking possession of or access to a grandchild must overcome the presumption that a parent acts in the child's best interest by proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that denial would significantly impair the child's physical health or emotional well-being. | Source |
| MCL 722.27b(4)(b) | Michigan | 2026 | Statute | Michigan presumes that a fit parent's decision to deny grandparenting time does not create a substantial risk of harm; the grandparent must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it does, or the court must dismiss. | Source |
| Conn. Gen. Stat. sec. 46b-59(a)(2), (b) | Connecticut | 2026 | Statute | Connecticut lets any person petition for visitation, but the court may grant it only on clear and convincing evidence of a parent-like relationship and that denial would cause real and significant harm, defined as the child being neglected or uncared for. | Source |
| 750 ILCS 5/602.9(b)(3), (4) | Illinois | 2026 | Statute | Illinois allows a grandparent, great-grandparent, sibling or step-parent visitation petition only after an unreasonable denial that has caused the child undue harm, presumes a fit parent's visitation decisions are not harmful, and puts the burden of proving undue harm on the petitioner. | Source |
| RCW 26.11.040(2), (3) | Washington | 2026 | Statute | Washington presumes that a fit parent's decision to deny nonparent visitation is in the child's best interest and does not create a likelihood of harm; the petitioner must prove likely harm or a substantial risk of harm by clear and convincing evidence. | Source |
| D.C. Code sec. 16-831.05(a) | District of Columbia | 2026 | Statute | In third-party custody proceedings the District presumes, unless a parent consents, that custody with the parent is in the child's best interests. | Source |
| D.C. Code sec. 16-831.06(b) | District of Columbia | 2026 | Statute | The third party seeking custody bears the burden of rebutting the parental presumption by clear and convincing evidence. | Source |
| D.C. Code sec. 16-831.07(a), (b) | District of Columbia | 2026 | Statute | The presumption is rebutted only on clear and convincing findings of abandonment or a parent unwilling or unable to care for the child, detriment to the child, or written exceptional circumstances; a parent's lack of financial means does not count. | Source |
| Fla. Stat. sec. 752.011(1), (4) | Florida | 2026 | Statute | Florida grandparent visitation requires a prima facie showing of parental unfitness or significant harm to proceed, and clear and convincing evidence of unfitness or significant harm, best interest, and no material harm to the parent-child relationship to be granted. | Source |
| NRS 125C.050(3), (4) | Nevada | 2026 | Statute | Nevada third-party visitation is available only after a parent has denied or unreasonably restricted visits, and that denial creates a rebuttable presumption that visitation is not in the child's best interests, rebuttable only by clear and convincing evidence. | Source |
| C.R.S. sec. 14-10-112(2), (6) | Colorado | 2024 | Statute | Colorado separation-agreement terms bind the court unless unconscionable, except the terms on parental responsibilities, child support and parenting time, which also cannot be made unmodifiable. | Source |
| A.R.S. sec. 25-317(B), (D) | Arizona | 2026 | Statute | Arizona separation-agreement terms bind the court unless unfair, except the terms on child support, legal decision-making and parenting time; the agreement enters the decree only if the court finds it reasonable as to those terms. | Source |
| 750 ILCS 5/502(b) | Illinois | 2026 | Statute | Illinois marital-settlement terms bind the court unless unconscionable, except the terms on child support and the allocation of parental responsibilities. | Source |
| Mo. Rev. Stat. sec. 452.325.2 | Missouri | 2026 | Statute | Missouri separation-agreement terms bind the court unless unconscionable, except the terms on custody, support and visitation of children. | Source |
| Mont. Code Ann. sec. 40-4-201(2), (4) | Montana | 2025 | Statute | Montana separation-agreement terms bind the court unless unconscionable, except the terms on support, parenting and parental contact; the agreement enters the decree only if not unsatisfactory as to support. | Source |
| D.C. Code sec. 16-916.01(o) | District of Columbia | 2026 | Statute | A District consent order or agreement on child support is compared with the guideline; a different amount stands only if the judicial officer finds it fair and just and justifies the departure in writing. | Source |
| N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law sec. 240(1-b)(h) | New York | 2026 | Statute | New York parents may agree to deviate from the child support guideline, but the agreement must recite the guideline amount and the reasons for departing from it, that requirement cannot be waived, and the court keeps discretion over support. | Source |
| C.R.S. sec. 14-10-115(9), (11)(a) | Colorado | 2024 | Statute | Colorado adds net child care only when incurred because of a parent's employment, job search or education, capped at quality licensed care; private-school and transport costs are divided only by agreement or court order, and only if reasonable and necessary. | Source |
| N.M. Stat. sec. 40-4-11.1(J) | New Mexico | 2026 | Statute | New Mexico shares net reasonable child care in proportion to income only when it is incurred because of a parent's employment or job search. | Source |
| D.C. Code sec. 16-916.01(k) | District of Columbia | 2026 | Statute | The District divides reasonable child care incurred because of either parent's employment or education in proportion to income, measured by actual family experience unless that is not in the child's best interest. | Source |
| Cal. Fam. Code sec. 4062(a)(1), (b)(1) | California | 2024 | Statute | California must add child care actually incurred for employment or reasonably necessary education or training for employment skills; educational or special-needs costs are a discretionary add-on. | Source |
| N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law sec. 240(1-b)(c)(4), (6), (7) | New York | 2026 | Statute | New York prorates child care incurred because the custodial parent works or attends education leading to employment; care while seeking work may be apportioned; private or enriched education is a separate discretionary award. | Source |
How this was checked
Every citation here was checked against the primary source rather than a summary. U.S. Supreme Court quotes come from the official United States Reports PDFs published by the Library of Congress, and the reporter page shown is the page the quoted words actually print on. State case quotes come from the Caselaw Access Project's page-anchored text of the official reporter. Statutes and regulations are quoted from the issuing legislature's or agency's own site. Quotes are normalised to plain ASCII, which changes punctuation only, never words. Holdings are distinguished from dicta and from concurrences and dissents, which bind nobody, and contrary authority is included and labelled. Not yet reviewed is NOT a finding: it means nobody has read that jurisdiction's law for this question yet, and such a row carries no claim at all. No authority found is a different and weaker statement: a search was run and turned up nothing on point, which is not proof that nothing exists.
Dataset last reviewed 2026-10-17.
Educational reference, not legal advice. Nothing here creates an attorney-client relationship. Family law is state-specific and it changes: a statute or case cited here may have been amended, repealed or overruled since the review date shown. Verify against the primary source before relying on anything on this page, and talk to a lawyer licensed in your state about your own situation.
Related: Family Court Reforms Map tracks where reform bills stand, and Can parents agree without the state? goes deeper on private agreements.